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Preface 
The research project on Systems Analysis of Technological and Economic Dynamics at  IIASA is 
concerned with modeling technological and organisational change; the broader economic devel- 
opments that  are associated with technological change, both as cause and effect; the processes 
by which economic agents - first of all, business firms - acquire and develop the capabilities 
to generate, imitate and adopt technological and organisational innovations; and the aggregate 
dynamics - a t  the levels of single industries and whole economies - engendered by the interac- 
tions among agents which are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioural rules and 
expectations. The central purpose is to develop stronger theory and better modeling techniques. 
However, the basic philosophy is that  such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when 
attention is paid to the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims to address: 
therefore, a considerable effort is put into a better understanding of the 'stylized facts' concern- 
ing corporate organisation routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the 'demography' of 
firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade. 
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress has been made on 
various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary differential 
and difference equations, and some of it stochastic equations. A number of efforts have taken 
advantage of the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more traditional 
mathematics. .AS a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for modeling technological and 
economic dynamics is significantly richer than it was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical understanding. 
There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known about 
the similarities and differences of technical advance in different fields and industries and there is 
some understanding of the key variables that lie behind those differences. A number of studies 
have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves with technology. In 
addition to  empirical work a t  the technology or sector level, the last decade has also seen a 
great deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured technical advance at  the 
level of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists on the facts that  
seem associated with different rates of productivity growth across the range of nations, with the 
dynamics of convergence and divergence in the levels and rates of growth of income, with the 
diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is embedded. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that  successful theory and useful 
modeling techniques ought to  address now are much more clearly defined. The theoretical work 
has often been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that  needed t o  be explained. 
The list of these 'facts' is indeed very long, ranging from the microeconomic evidence concerning 
for example dynamic increasing returns in learning activities or the persistence of particular sets 
of problem-solving routines within business firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and 
size-distributions - approximately log-normal - all the way to the evidence regarding the time- 
series properties of major economic aggregates. However, the connection between the theoretical 
work and the empirical phenomena has so far not been very close. The philosophy of this project 
is that the chances of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical techniques can 
be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an environment where scholars who understand 
the empirical phenomena provide questions and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
In particular, the project is meant to  pursue an 'evolutionary' interpretation of technological 
and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by which individual agents and organisa- 
tions learn, search, adapt; second, the economic analogues of 'natural selection' by which inter- 
active environments - often markets - winnow out a population whose members have different 
attributes and behavioural traits; and, third, the collective emergence of statistical patterns, 
regularities and higher-level structures as the aggregate outcomes of the two former processes. 
Together with a group of researchers located permanently a t  IIASA, the project coordinates 
multiple research efforts undertaken in several institutions around the world, organises workshops 
and provides a venue of scientific discussion among scholars working on evolutionary modeling, 
computer simulation and non-linear dynamical systems. 
The research focuses upon the following three major areas: 
1. Learning Processes and Organisational Competence. 
2. Technological and Industrial D~namics  
3. Innovation, Competition and Macrodynamics 
An Agenda for Formal Growth Theory' 
I. Introduction 
From at least the late 1950s, most formal models of economic growth have recognized technical 
advance as the key driving force, and thus have been consistent with a central conclusion of the empirical 
research on the sources of growth. However most of the earlier formal models were mute or incoherent 
regarding the sources of technical advance. In recent years a number of new formal models have been 
developed which make technological advance endogenous, involving centrally the profit-seeking 
investments of business firms (see e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 1990, Grossman and Helpman, 1989 and 
Romer, 1990). These models capture in stylized form a number of the understandings about technical 
advance that have been well documented by empirical scholars. (For a good survey see Freeman, 1982) 
To build in features that make R and D profitable for firms, these models depart from the earlier 
ones in one or both of the following. First, firms are able to keep proprietary at least a portion of the 
value of the increased productivity or better product performance won through their R and D. Second, 
to square with the recognition that technology is in some degree proprietary, and also that support of R 
and D is feasible only if price exceeds production cost by some margin, markets are assumed to be 
imperfectly, not perfectly, competitive. (For a good statement see Grossman and Helpman, 1994) 
The endogenizing of technical advance in this way has been complemented by the building in or 
deduction of other phenomena. Thus some of the models treat technical advance as a process of "creative 
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destruction" in which a new technology obsoletes older ones (See Grossman and Helpman, 1989). In 
many of the models there are "externalities" from investments in R and D, as in Romer, 1990, or from 
other activities, for example, education (See Lucas, 1988). Up front R and D investments and, in some 
models, other factors such as differentiation of intermediate products that enable varied production needs 
to be met better as an economy gets larger, generate economies of scale. In many of these models the 
rate of investment in new plant and equipment affects the steady state growth rate, because of scale 
economies or externalities or both, whereas in most of the older generation of models the steady state 
growth rate was independent of the investment rate. 
The characterization above does not do justice to the elegance of some of the new growth models, 
nor does it lay out the variety. (For more extended and systematic reviews see Romer, 1991 and 1994, 
and Verspagen, 1992). However, it suffices to bring out two points. First, these formal models are 
different than most of the earlier ones, and in ways that make them more "realistic" in the sense of 
capturing, at least in stylized form, features of growth that many economists studying the topic 
empirically long have known to be important. Incorporation of these features certainly makes it easier 
for formal growth theorizing to engage effectively with the empirical work of economists trying to come 
to grips with the puzzling features of experienced economic growth. 
However, second, the brief review also sufices to highlight that the phenomena incorporated in 
the new formal models, and neglected in many of the old ones, scarcely represent novel new insights or 
ideas. The basic notions that "technical change is largely endogenous", "technology is to at least some 
extent proprietary, and market structures supporting technical advance are not perfectly competitive", 
"new technology often obsoletes old technology", "growth fueled by technical advance involves 
externalities and economies of scale", and "the investment rate may matter in long run", scarcely smack 
of novelty. All have been part of the body of understanding of those studying economic growth and 
technical advance for a long time. (Freeman, 1982, already cited, is a good reference). Indeed, as I 
shall show in the next section, Abramovitz put forth most of these propositions in his review article on 
the economics of growth, written over forty years ago, in 1952. 
If, in fact, much of what has been included in the new formal growth models long has been 
understood by scholars in the field, one can ask what is added by formalization of this understanding. 
I will argue several things are. However to get to them I need to discuss more generally the nature of 
theorizing in economics. 
Sidney Winter and I have argued (1982) that, perhaps because the subject matter and the operative 
mechanisms of economics are so complex, theorizing in economics tends to proceed at at least two levels 
of formality, not one. We have called these levels appreciative theory and formal theory. 
Appreciative theorizing tends to be close to empirical work and provides both guidance and 
interpretation. Mostly it is expressed verbally and is the analyst's articulation of what he or she thinks 
really is going on. However, appreciative theory is very much an abstract body of reasoning. Certain 
variables and relationships are treated as important, and others are ignored. There generally is explicit 
causal argument. On the other hand, appreciative theorizing tends to stay quite close to the empirical 
substance. 
In contrast, formal theorizing almost always proceeds at some intellectual distance from what is 
known empirically, and where it does appeal to data for support, the appeal generally is to "stylized 
facts", or reasonably good "statistical fits". If the hallmark of appreciative theory is storytelling that is 
close to the empirical details, the hallmark of formal theorizing is an abstract structure set up to enable 
one to explore, find, and check proposed logical connections. Good formal theorizing usually will 
contain fewer strictly logical gaps than appreciative theorizing and will be mostly consistent. Also, the 
logical inferences will tend to reach farther than those of appreciative theorizing. 
We have proposed that, when the intellectual enterprise in economics is going well, empirical 
research, appreciative theorizing, and formal theorizing work together or rather, empirical work and 
appreciative theorizing work together, and appreciative and formal theorizing work together. Empirical 
findings or facts seldom influence formal theorizing directly. Rather, in the first instance they influence 
appreciative theorizing, that is what the empirical researchers want to highlight and draw from their work. 
In turn, appreciative theorizing provides challenges to formal theory to encompass its understandings in 
stylized form. The attempt to do so may identify gaps or inconsistencies in the verbal stories, and 
suggest new mechanisms and connections to explore. In turn the empirical and appreciative theoretical 
research enterprise may be reoriented. 
Under this account, formal theory should not be understood as exhausting the body of theoretical 
understanding possessed by economists working in a field. Rather, it needs to be seen as touching on 
only a portion of that broader body, and as addressing what it does in highly stylized form. On the other 
hand, formal theory is the most rigorously worked out part of theory. 
One very important role of formal theory obviously is to discipline and sharpen appreciative 
theory. In so doing it may or may not break new ground. But whether it does or not, where appreciative 
theory is not so disciplined, the body of understanding possessed by economists is of uncertain rigor. 
Another important role of formal theorizing in contemporary economics is, somehat 
paradoxically, to get the understandings it contains into the view of the profession at large. For whatever 
reasons, graduate training in economics tends to emphasize formal models. When graduate students take 
a first course in a field, the models are mostly what they are taught. Formal models in a specialized 
field, if they are analytically interesting, also have a much easier time getting into the more general and 
widely read economic journals, particularly if they are accompanied by some econometrics, than looser 
form appreciative theoretic discussions. The latter, therefore, tend to be read and known principally by 
the specialists in a field. 
It is for these reasons that the new formal growth models are having a positive effect on research 
on economic growth. The scholars who have long been working in the field are, in many cases, being 
stimulated to think about their appreciative theories in different ways, even though most of them would 
grumble that they already knew what the models teach. Perhaps more important, the new formal growth 
theories are spreading the word around the profession, and attracting graduate students into the field. 
The perspective I have laid out thus enables me to say where and how I see the new formal 
growth models as contributing significantly, even if the ideas they contain may not be very new. That 
perspective also enables me to explain the title of this essay. I will propose that, while it has picked up 
a number of important strands in appreciative growth theorizing, the new formal modeling enterprise has 
not recognized several other important strands. 
I shall develop my case as follows. In Section I1 I present an analytic history of "theorizing" 
about economic growth from the early 1950s to the early 1980s, focusing on two matters. One is the 
nature of the interaction between appreciative and formal theorizing during this period. The other is the 
growing sense of malaise in the intellectual enterprise that set in after the 1970s, as conventional 
theoretical ideas came to be perceived as having little grip on the puzzles associated with growth 
slowdown. Then, in Section 111, I discuss various pieces of new appreciative theory that have come into 
view since the late 1970s. In particular I describe recent theorizing about technology, firms, and 
institutions. In the concluding section I pull together my argument that these define an agenda for formal 
growth theory. 
11. Post-war Theorizing About Economic Growth 
Economic growth of course was a central interest of Adam Smith, and many of the classical 
economists of the 19th century. However, during the first half of the 20th century the topic dropped out 
of vogue, as microeconomic analysis increasingly came under the sway of partial and general equilibrium 
theory, and, with the Great Depression, macroeconomic analysis became obsessed with unemployment. 
After World War I1 a number of economists again became interested in economic growth. The new surge 
of research on economic growth was not kindled by any arresting new theory in economics. Rather, a 
principal motivation for the new research was the availability of new economic statistics, particularly the 
national income and product statistics, which Simon Kuznets pioneered and which for the first time 
enabled economists to measure growth at a national level. 
A. The State of Growth Theorv. as of 1952 
In 1952 A Sumev of Contemporarv Economics was published, which attempted to assess the state 
of the discipline then. It contained an article on the economics of growth by Moses Abramovitz, who 
was very much involved in this new research. For my purposes there are two important features of that 
article. First, Abramovitz begins with a statement about the absence at that time of any coherent modern 
growth theory to guide empirical research. "Unlike most of the topics treated in the Survey, the problem 
with economic growth lacks any organized and genuinely known body of doctrine whose recent 
development might furnish the subject of this essay. " The reader will of course note that Abramovitz was 
writing a few years before the publication of the Solow and Swan pieces (1956) which are reputed to have 
established modern growth theory, and be tempted to take his statement as an indication that those articles 
filled an intellectual vacuum. 
But the other noteworthy aspect of Abramovitz' essay is the up-to-date character, by 
contemporary standards, of the issues and relationships that he discusses. It is as if most of what formal 
neoclassical growth theory later taught already was known. Thus there is a clear statement of the logic 
behind modern growth accounting, a logic which was being used in the empirical work with which he 
was involved. Abramovitz notes that economists long have professed a theory that the level of output 
is determined by the quantity of inputs (land, labor and capital) and factors that affect their productivity 
(the state of the arts, industrial and financial organization, the legal system, etc.). Therefore, at one 
level at least, economic growth can be understood as a function of changes in or improvements in these 
"immediate determinants of output." Abramovitz also proposes that analysis of growth simply at this 
level is not deep enough, and that a satisfactory theory of growth must come to grips with the forces 
behind changes in the immediate determinants. 
His essay goes on to analyze the forces affecting the expansion of the traditional factors of 
production: land, labor, capital, and of their contribution to growth. Among other features of his 
discussion, Abramovitz refers to the view common in economics that the marginal productivity of capital 
will be high or low depending on the ratio of capital to other factors, and will diminish as capital grows 
relative to them--clearly this characteristic of the "old" neoclassical growth theory did not come as news. 
But he then goes on to argue that increases in economic efficiency as the scale of output grows may offset 
diminishing returns--a feature built into some of the "new" neoclassical growth theory. 
Abramovitz states that, in his view at least, "technical improvement" must account for "a very 
large share, if not the bulk, of the increase in output." Thus while the empirical evidence that persuaded 
others of the economics community on this was not yet in, Abramovitz could not have been surprised by 
it. Abramovitz clearly sees technical advance as "endogenous", resulting largely from investments aimed 
to create and exploit it, and anticipates the concept of "knowledge capital" as follows. "And insofar as 
new applied knowledge results from the deliberate direction of revenues to its discovery and use, the 
stock of knowledge is increased by a process identical with that which produces increases in the stock 
of material equipment. " Referring to Schumpeter (1950) he observes, "with the development of industrial 
research departments of corporations.. .almost all engineering work is undertaken only in conjunction with 
the deliberate entrepreneurial decision." Some of the proponents of the new growth theory have argued 
that, until recently, analysts of growth were hung up on a growth theory that assumed perfect 
competition, but Abramovitz clearly didn't have that hang up. Abramovitz also recognized that the 
investments that yield new proprietary technology also generate externalities, at least with time, "as 
experience is gained and knowledge of the new art becomes widespread." 
Abramovitz highlights the interdependence of technical progress and the expansion of other 
factors as sources of growth. Vintage models would not have come as news to him. "The actual 
exploitation of new knowledge virtually always involves some gross investment (in material equipment). " 
Abramovitz goes on to imbed his analyses of expansion of the traditional inputs to production, 
and of technical advance as the major factor augmenting their productivity, in a discussion of "enterprise" 
and "institutions". He already had focussed on modern corporations as key actors in technical progress, 
and in investing in material equipment. He then observes that "the role of enterprise has been slighted 
by traditional theory because of the theory's generally static character which leads easily to assumptions 
about perfect knowledge, and rational calculation of profit." He goes on to suggest that, if one finds 
Schumpeter's analysis persuasive, one is compelled to recognize that "the marginal productivity of capital 
depends on enterprise to such a degree" that to neglect it is to miss the whole point of capitalist economic 
development. Here Abramovitz is, in the view I will espouse, far ahead of developments in even the 
"new" neoclassical growth theory, at least as that work has developed to date. 
He also is far out in front in his discussion of the broader cultural and institutional factors 
surrounding and supporting enterprise. Here he expresses the judgement that the broader context is key, 
and also his concerns that "The general conclusion suggested by this survey of the factors controlling the 
vigor of enterprise is that a vast deal of emphasis must be placed on forces that, in the ordinary 
conception of the bounds of economics, would have to be classed as political, psychological, or 
sociological." Abramovitz thus flags the challenge for economists, and stresses that, to unravel the 
mysteries of economic growth, economists have got to get into these issues. Mostly of course we 
haven't. The focus of almost all research on economic growth since Abramovitz wrote has been on his 
"immediate" determinants. 
I have dwelt at some length on Abramovitz' essay, pointing to its modern tone as well as to its 
richness. Abramovitz clearly is, and was, a remarkable scholar. But in his 1952 essay he does not 
present his theorizing about growth as particularly original. Indeed he writes as if he were recounting 
notions long held in economics, and held at the time he was writing by other scholars getting into 
empirical study of economic growth, for example, Simon Kuznets. 
B. Em~irical Research on Growth Durinp the 1950s and 1960s 
At the time Abramovitz wrote, a number of economists were hard at work doing empirical 
research on growth using the new National Income and Product accounts, and other new data. By the 
early 1950s the results of that research, probing the immediate determinants of growth, began to come 
in. Studies by Schmookler (1952), Schultz (1953), Fabricant (1954), Kendrick (1956) and Abramovitz 
himself (1956), all reported that the growth of output experienced in the United States had been 
significantly greater than reasonably could be attributed to input growth. 
In these papers the contribution of total input growth was estimated by weighing the different 
inputs by their prices, a practice apparently considered so reasonable and obvious that few of the authors 
even bothered to rationalize it explicitly. (While not recognized by many at the time, an earlier paper 
by Tinbergen, 1942, had anticipated much of the methodology). The excess of output growth over input 
growth was attributed to a variety of factors. Technological advance, increasing returns to scale, 
investments in human capital, the allocation of resources from lower to higher productivity activities, all 
were recognized as parts of the story, but these authors clearly put heavy stress on the former. 
It is interesting that Solow's 1957 piece, which most economists not immersed in research on 
economic growth regard as the seminal article calculating the "residual" and interpreting it as a measure 
of technological advance, was published after the studies noted above. The reason for the impact of 
Solow's piece, I would argue, is that his analysis was structured by a "formal" theory, whereas the 
theorizing in these earlier pieces was more "appreciative" and looser. 
Edward Denison's research and writings based on growth accounting, which began to get 
published in the early 1960s, enormously increased our understanding of economic growth, at least at the 
level that Abramovitz had referred to as the "immediate determinants." Regarding growth in the United 
States, Denison's (1962) conclusions basically were consistent with those published earlier by the scholars 
cited above, and his contribution mainly involved an ingenious and painstaking attempt to break down 
the sources of total factor productivity growth into the various components mentioned above. Other 
economists followed along the same track, developing other kinds of disaggregation and exploring 
different measures of factor marginal productivity. (See e.g. Jorgenson and Griliches, 1967). Later in 
the 1960s Denison (1968) extended his framework to examination of growth in the European economies, 
with findings that were quite similar to what had been found about the U.S. (See also Domar, 1963). 
However, this study also probed at the reasons why European worker productivity was 
significantly lower than American (in the early 1960s roughly half). The key finding here was as 
remarkable as the earlier finding that growth of total factor productivity accounted for the bulk of 
productivity growth. It was that differences in inputs per worker could account for only a small share 
of the differences between American and European productivity levels, and that apparently European 
nations were operating at significantly lower levels of "total factor productivity" than the Americans. 
Denison's work came after the publication of Solow's theoretical and empirical essays on growth. 
However, there is little evidence that these articles influenced him much. Denison footnotes only the 
Solow empirical article,and the substance of the footnotes is about differences in statistical details. 
While most of the new work on economic growth was focused at the macro or economy-wide 
level, some was oriented to the sectoral or industry level. Thus during the early 1960s economists came 
to learn that the significant inter-industry differences in rates of labor productivity growth, of which they 
long had been aware, largely was associated with differences in rates of growth of total factor 
productivity, again interpreted as largely reflecting differences in rates of technical advance. The new 
availability of industry level R and D data permitted Terleckyj (1960) to explore the connections. His 
work showed a reasonably strong relationship (by the standards of economists) between industry total 
factor productivity growth and industry R and D intensity. Kendrick (1973, 1980), Edwin Mansfield 
(1968), and Dale Jorgenson and colleagues (1980) also did important work exploring cross industry 
differences in growth and the factors behind the differences. 
Other parts of the research enterprise focused on various of the sources of growth. Two are 
important to mention here. 
Stimulated by the work of Theodore Schultz (1961) and, later, Gary Becker (1962), a sizable 
cluster of research grew up concerned with "human capital". That work analyzed investments in human 
capital through both formal education and work experience. Portions of this research clearly recognized 
externalities, in some cases of a "network" variety (as it has come to be called), in some cases because 
workers may leave the firms that trained them carrying those skills (which deters firms from investing 
in much training), and in some cases because the work some of them do - for example R&D - generates 
externalities. 
Another sizable cluster of research grew up around the topic of technical change. That work 
proceeded within a number of different styles, from econometric (Griliches 1957, 1973 and Mansfield 
1968, 197 1, 1977), to historical (Rosenberg 1976, 1982 and Freeman, 1982). Jacob Schrnookler (1966) 
did pioneering work using patents as a measure of inventive input. The research by scholars working 
in this field covered a range of topics from those stimulated by Schumpeter (Do industries where the 
firms are large and have considerable market power experience more rapid technical advance than more 
fragmented industries?), to more general factors that are associated with interindustry differences in 
technical advance, to the connections between science and technology, to the difference between private 
and social returns to R&D. 
These kinds of analyses certainly alerted many economists both to the fact that technical advance 
is largely endogenous, and to the fact that private returns to education and to R and D might not measure 
well the contribution of expansions in these "stocks" to economic output. Some economists also argued 
that investment in new plant and equipment contributed more to growth than the private rate of return 
indicated, because new capital embodied new technology and enabled the experience to accumulate to 
enable its further advance, or because such investment often was associated with the shift of labor from 
lower to higher value activities, etc. (See e.g. Nelson, 1964) 
My discussion above of the Renaissance and blooming of research on economic growth during 
the 1950's and 60's hardly mentions developments in formal growth theory. As I noted, the enterprise 
was well on its way before the publication of Solow's and Swan's theoretical essays that are widely 
regarded as having provided the basic ideas for analyses of growth. My point is that most of the basic 
theoretical ideas that guided empirical analyses of growth already were there. 
By that I certainly do not mean that the early works of Abramovitz and Kendrick or Denison 
proceeded independently of economic theory, or even neoclassical theory. But the production function 
idea had been around for a long time, as had the idea that the change in output could be explained in 
terms of changes in the inputs of the production function and changes in productivity. Abramovitz treats 
these ideas as essentially "old hat" in his 1952 essay. The notion that, in growth accounting, the output 
increase stemming from an increase in an input might be approximated by the price of that input was a 
simple application of neoclassical factor remuneration theory. The idea that the difference between 
output growth and the factor price weighted growth of input measures growth of "total factor 
productivity" did not depend on formal neoclassical growth theory. 
As the various citations from the Abramovitz 1952 article show, one did not need a formal model 
to have a theory that new technology often needs to be embedded in new physical capital. The idea that 
technical advance often is the result of prior investments in R and D, or that education is reflected in 
human capital similarly were around long before they were incorporated in formal models. 
What, then, did the advent and development of formal neoclassical growth theory contribute to 
the enterprise? In a few cases it added ideas and techniques that were distinctly new. Indeed, the basic 
proposition in Solow's first growth model, that if diminishing returns to capital are strong, the steady 
state growth rate is independent of the savings rate, certainly came as something of a surprise to most 
economists, although many did not believe it. The development and application of duality theory to 
analysis of growth almost certainly would not have occurred absent formal theoretical work. (See e.g. 
Gollop and Jorgenson, 1980; Jorgenson, 1986) The puttyclay model (Solow, Tobin, and von Weizacher, 
1966) is another example of formal theorizing developing ideas far beyond the stage where appreciative 
theorizing alone could carry them. However, I think it fair to say that for the most part what formal 
growth modeling did was to shape up and sharpen appreciative theoretic ideas that had been in the 
community for some time. 
I would propose that the most important contribution of the old neoclassical formal growth theory 
to research in the field was to make that field more legitimate than it had been, even sexy, and thus to 
attract many more young economists to its pursuit than would have come, absent the development of 
formal neoclassical growth theory. One of the tones of Abramovitz' 1952 review piece is that of isolation 
from the contemporary main stream of economics. Reading it, it is difficult to imagine the surge of 
young economists coming into the field in the late 1950s and 1960s. It is quite possible that, absent 
Solow's 1957 article which expressly grounded the empirical calculations in formal neoclassical growth 
theory, the empirical work of Kendrick and Denison, which involved vastly more digging and calculating, 
would have received much less attention. 
In any case, studies conducted in the 1950's' 1960's' and early 1970's enormously increased our 
understanding of economic growth. Most of their findings have not been overturned by subsequent 
studies. The other side of this coin is that subsequent studies following the same line have added little 
that is new. By the early 1970's there is clear evidence that research of the sort I have described above 
was experiencing sharply diminishing returns. 
C. The Sea-change of the 1970's 
This fact was obscured by the sea-change in economic growth that occurred during the late 1960's 
and early 1970's. By the middle of the 1970's, the key question facing analysts of economic growth was 
not how to explain the relatively rapid growth that had been experienced by most countries in the early 
post-war period, but rather "Why has growth slowed down so significantly?". 
It was natural that the early studies of the productivity growth slowdown used the same 
methodology that had been employed in the earlier studies of growth, and focused on much the same 
variables. (See e.g. Denison, 1979, Griliches, 1980). Denison style analysis showed that, given 
neoclassical assumptions, while some of the slowdown could be attributed to a fall-off in the rate of 
physical investment, the principal culprit was a collapse in the rate of growth of total factor productivity. 
A number of ingenious explanations were put forth as to why higher energy prices, which were 
contemporaneous, should have both deterred physical investment (energy and physical capital were 
complements) and reduced the economic value of technical advance that followed along old lines 
(technical advance had been energy using). (For a discussion see Jorgenson, 1986). However somehow 
the explanations never were convincing. And as relative energy prices declined while slow growth 
continued, the attempts to explain why growth had slowed so much from the heyday of the 1960s changed 
orientation. 
Those whose attention was focused on the United States began to raise the question as to whether 
the falling off of total factor productivity growth reflected a decline in the rate of technical advance, for 
some reason. A certain amount of empirical research was directed at that question, but I shall focus here 
on the more theoretical discussion. There it was proposed that the falling off of the rapid total factor 
productivity growth after World War I1 might well have been the consequence of the gradual mining out 
of the technological opportunities that had been opened up by some major breakthroughs that occurred 
during the 1930s, and during World War 11, but which had not been exploited effectively until the 
postwar period. Some of this discussion appealed to Schumpeter's theory (1939) that long waves in 
economic activity were engendered by the fact that fundamental technological breakthroughs occur 
occasionally, and in clusters. Such developments prefigure a period of rapid economic growth, which 
then peters out as the new possibilities got mined out, with a resurgence of rapid growth being then 
dependent upon some major new technological breakthroughs. 
A number of economists questioned this interpretation, arguing that, just about the time when 
productivity growth slowed down, computer technology was beginning its amazing spurt. Thus Robert 
Solow has been credited with the remark that "computers are everywhere, but in the productivity 
statistics". This quip was the motivation behind Paul David's careful work (1991) assessing the length 
of time it took before fundamental advances in electrical technology, most of which occurred before the 
beginning of the twentieth century, began to have major effects on productivity. David argued that it 
wasn't until the 1920s that that effect really took hold. His story recounted the very large number of 
relatively minor technological advances that needed to be achieved before the potential latent in electrical 
technology could be exploited, and also the changes in firm organization, and institutional arrangements, 
that were required. 
The discussion of whether in fact there has been a significant decline in the rate of technical 
advance, or at least the reflection of technical advance in productivity growth, since the early 1970s 
remains inconclusive. However, one consequence of that discussion is that economists, concerned with 
that question, have a much richer understanding of the nature of technical advance, and of the 
intertwining of technical advance with organizational and institutional changes, than they used to have. 
Another important body of appreciative theorizing set off by economists struggling to understand 
the sources of the productivity growth slowdown can be grouped under the banner of "convergence 
theory". The slowdown of growth in the United States was accompanied by sharpening perceptions that 
the other major industrial nations were growing faster than the Americans, and catching up. However, 
as attention focused on these phenomena, two others matters came into view. One was that this catching 
up was not something that began in the 1970s, but rather had been occurring since the 1950s. The other 
was that the European economies and Japan also had been experiencing significant slowdown in growth 
since the early 1970s. 
The starting point for much of the theorizing, and empirical work, about convergence was the 
observation that, at the end of World War 11, Europe and Japan were far behind the United States 
technologically and, in many cases, in the organization and management of modern business enterprises. 
Thus there were major opportunities for those nations to increase their labor and total factor productivity 
by adopting American practice, and the physical investments needed to do this were highly profitable. 
According to this theory, the very rapid growth after World War I1 in Europe and Japan can be explained 
largely as this catching up or "convergence" process. (See e.g. Abramovitz, 1986 and Baumol, 1986). 
The other side of this coin is that, as these nations caught up with the United States, opportunities for 
further rapid growth through emulation diminished. This is why slower growth in Europe and Japan, 
which set in during the late 1960s, was inevitable. However, as the research on the convergence 
hypothesis proceeded, various complications came into view. In the first place, the U.S. productivity and 
technology lead over Great Britain and Europe was very large even prior to World War I, and there is 
little evidence of "catching up" in the interwar period. What has been different about the postwar era? 
Second, while the simplest version of the convergence hypothesis would lead one to expect that countries 
farthest behind the leader would experience the most rapid "catching up", the relationship here is weak. 
While it is consistent, for example, with Japan's very rapid growth in the 1950s and 1960s, when Japan 
was, arguably, behind Great Britain and Western Europe as well as the United States, it seems 
inconsistent with Japan's continuing relatively rapid growth after it surpassed Great Britain. 
Regarding the first question, Gavin Wright and I (1992) have elaborated an hypothesis, put forth 
by Abramovitz in his 1986 essay, that the post World War II environment of relatively open trade in 
manufactured goods and natural resources, and free international flow of both financial and physical 
capital, made the postwar era far more conducive to convergence among nations with the requisite skills 
and institutions than the interwar period. However, while some may find this argument persuasive, it 
is apparent that it is a complex one about the role of national and international institutions in the growth 
process. 
Regarding the second puzzle, Abramovitz (1986) has used the term "social capabilities" to denote 
whatever it takes for a national economy to take on board productively the technology and organizational 
practices of the leading economy. He has provided a sensible list of what might lie behind social 
capabilities. Adequate "human capital", ability to organize and manage competent firms, financial and 
educational institutions that can support economic development, all are on the list. Abramovitz' use of 
the term "social capabilities" suggests that more generally he means by them the "political, psychological, 
or sociological" factors he had in mind in his 1952 essay. Other economists have used the term 
"institutions" to denote much the same thing (see e.g. North, 1990). 
There is a long tradition in economics of pointing to institutional factors as explaining differing 
economic performance among nations. Much of Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations is exactly about 
this. Institutional factors are central in many arguments about why Britain lost her position of 
technological leadership to the United States and Great Britain in the early years of the twentieth century. 
Thus according to one account (see Landes, 1970, for a good exposition), by the late nineteenth century 
the new chemical product and electrical technology required university trained scientists and engineers 
for their development, and called for firms that funded and supported industrial R and D laboratories. 
The U.S. and Germany had educational systems that were responsive to the former need, and were able 
to support the growth of firms that could meet the latter, whereas Britain was less able. Chandler (1990), 
and in a different way Lazonick (1990), have placed strong weight on differences between Great Britain, 
on the one hand, and the U.S. and Germany, on the other, in the way large firms were organized and 
managed. 
The recent literature proposing that Japan is overtaking the U.S. as the leading technological and 
economic power similarly is concerned mostly with firms and institutions supporting them. The argument 
is that Japanese firms are more capable than American ones of making long term investments in the 
physical, but particularly human, capital, that now are needed to be competitive in many industries 
(Lazonick, 1990). Japanese firms also are more flexible in the specification of jobs, and job assignments, 
and less compartmentalized organizationally (see e.g. Dertouzos et al, 1989, Womack et al, 1990, and 
Aoki, 1990.) The relatively rigid hierarchical organization of American firms which served adequately 
in an earlier era is a handicap in an era of rapid technological change, and Japanese firms are much better 
able to deal effectively with the new contingencies. In turn, the nature of Japanese capital and labor 
markets, and the Japanese educational system, provides support for the practice of Japanese firms in 
making long run investments in broadly training their workers. 
I note several common elements to the appreciative theoretic lines of argument sketched above. 
First, in Abramovitz' terms, they all represent attempts to get "behind" the "immediate" variables 
influencing production and economic growth. General neoclassical economic theory, and this is what 
guided most of growth theorizing during the 1950s and 1960s, both formal and appreciative, is focussed 
on inputs, outputs, prices, their equilibrium configurations, and associated phenomena. It is not well 
oriented towards considering things like technology as a body of practice and understanding, firms as 
productive organizations, or national and international institutions, particularly those that shape the 
evolution of technology and the organization and behavior of firms, which clearly lie "behind" in some 
sense the immediate determinants. Yet this is exactly what the theoretical stories sketched above are 
about. 
Second, the appreciative theoretical accounts intertwine discussion of tehcnology and technical 
advance, with discussion of firms and institutions. While standard growth theory has taken on board 
technology, or at least its reflection in total factor productivity, and the new growth theory has explored 
various inputs contributing to technical advance, these theories have not yet struggled with the connections 
and relationships in the stories accounted above. 
Yet if the appreciative stories are on the mark, the attempts of the new formal growth theories 
to better come to grips with technical change may be sorely limited. From another point of view, the 
developing appreciative theory may be providing strong clues as to where formal theory ought to be 
trying to go. Or at least this is the theme I will be developing in the following sections. 
111. Teachings of Appreciative .Theorizing on Technology, Firms, and Economic Institutions 
The understandings that long run growth depends on technical progress, that technology is neither 
a pure public nor a pure private good but is something of both, and that for an economy or firm to tap 
into public knowledge generally requires significant investment on its part, have been taken aboard by 
much of the new formal growth theory. However, formal growth theorists have not given much attention 
to the question "What is technology anyhow?". 
There are of course a few simple metaphors about that. One is that prevailing technology is like 
"a set of blueprints", suggesting the conception of a "technology library", albeit one with some of the 
"books" proprietary. The notion that technology is "knowledge" also has been around for some time, 
suggesting something more embodied in humans. 
Research by economists on technology and technological change supports the idea that a lot about 
modern technologies is described in blueprints, texts, pictures, equations. However, in many fields it 
takes a highly trained professional to make sense of the "blueprints". Further, even for professionals, 
for most technologies access to the documents provides only a start on what it takes to make a technology 
work. A lot of learning by doing and using is often required to gain real mastery of a technology. And 
it is increasingly apparent that for many technologies much of the "knowledge" that is needed to 
command a technology is "know how", that is in the fingers as well as in the head. (For good discussion 
see Pavitt, 1987, and Dosi, 1988). 
These elements of appreciative theory regarding command over technology carry over to 
understandings about how technical advances comes about. Scholars of technical advance long have 
known the importance of investment in R and D, generally involving the employment of professionals 
trained in the relevant underlying engineering and scientific disciplines, in the generation and development 
of new technologies. However, they also long have understood that many technologies seem to 
experience a continuing stream of improvements that reflect understandings gained and changes wrought 
through learning by doing and using. (See e.g. Rosenberg, 1982.) In many technologies it is apparent 
that both processes are involved, and that they interact strongly. Thus while what is learned in 
experience sometimes directly results in changes in practice and design, in many cases this learning has 
its impact largely by feeding back to influence the problems and targets addressed through R and D. 
A number of studies now have documented that broad new technologies tend initially to be 
brought into practice in crude form, representing a bundle of potentialities, rather than practice that is 
operationally ready (see e.g. Enos, 1962, and Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993). The automobile, the 
airplane, the transistor, the computer, and the laser, all surfaced as new technologies of potential wide 
applicability, but requiring considerable work and ingenuity before they would be worth anything in 
economic use. It took a long time, and a lot of investments, and a lot of learning, and learning how to 
learn (Stiglitz, 1987) before these new technologies became major contributors to economic growth. 
And to a considerable extent, this learning went on in firms. While economists studying technical 
advance and economic growth now are coming to understand this, and some of its significance, this 
understanding has yet to get out very far in the profession at large. 
While there are changes in the air, until recently few economists have shown much interest in 
what actually goes on in firms. There are a number of reasons for the negelect. An important one is 
that, unlike scholars of business management and strategy, the interest of economists is mostly in 
variables at a level of aggregation well above that of individual firms, often macroeconomic variables, 
and even our "microeconomics" is about industry level variables rather than firm level ones. But perhaps 
a more basic reason is that we economists tend to work with theories that suggest that, at the levels of 
aggregation we are interested in, what firms do can be presumed to be determined by constraints, 
opportunities and incentives provided by the environment they are in. Thus, there is no call to look 
carefully at firms, per se. They are simply puppets dancing to the tune played by the market. 
However, under the appreciative theory sketched above, mastery of a technology is more like a 
skill that needs to be learned whose control requires practice than most neoclassical theorizing is wont 
to admit, and the entity that learns and practices is the firm. The practice of complex technologies 
inherently involves organization and management. The way a firm organizes to implement a common 
broad technology can make an enormous difference. This is a key finding of much of the recent work 
comparing U.S. and Japanese auto production. 
Studies of American and Japanese firms of the sort mentioned earlier has been one important 
stimulus to new thinking about firms. Another major stimulus, also mentioned earlier, has been 
Chandler's pioneering historical work on the rise of the modern corporation (1962, 1977, 1990). 
Particularly Chandler's work has led to the development of a small body of writings that see key firm 
capabilities as dynamic, rather than static, involving the ability to learn, adapt to changes in the 
environment, and innovate, and not simply to perform well given prevailing practice and conditions. (See 
Winter, 1988, and Dosi et al, 1992) This new body of writings on firms is, of course, quite conformable 
with the new theorizing about cumulative technical advance, sketched above. 
While there are signs lately that economists are paying more attention to firms, (e.g. Williamson, 
1985, Holmstrom and Tirole, 1989), few yet seem able to see firms as the key actors in economic growth 
in the sense that Schumpeter did, or more recently Chandler. Recall Abramovitz' citation of 
Schumpeter's argument that the productivity of capital, or R&D, is largely a function of "enterprise". 
Of course what firms do, and the technologies they employ, and develop, are influenced to a 
considerable extent by the environment they are in. Economists are inclined to define the environment 
in terms of markets. In turn behind markets are demanders of products and suppliers of inputs (who may 
be individuals or organizations like other firms), and their preferences, and the constraints they face. 
However in recent years at least some economists have become cognizant of aspects of the 
environment not really considered in the simple treatment. (In a way the new awareness of institutions 
represents a renaissance of earlier thinking. For a good discussion see Hodgson, 1988) There is 
increasing recognition among economists that there are entities out there like universities that do research 
that feeds into technical advance in industry, and whose teaching programs affect the supply of scientists 
and engineers, government agencies financing certain kinds of R and D, and others setting standards, 
banks and banking systems, and a variety of organizations and laws which affect labor supply, and 
demand. Patent, regulatory, and liability law are part of the environment. And so also are a variety of 
widely shared beliefs and values and customs that affect common expectations about what should be done, 
and what will be done, in a particular context. 
This is an extraordinarily complex bag of things, and it may be foolhardy to give a name to the 
collection. But as I have noted many scholars have called them all "institutions". 
One can question what is common about them. Some economists and other scholars have 
employed the language of game theory and attempted to define institutions as "the rules of the game" 
which, given the motivations of the players, constrain the way the "game" will be played. (See e.g. 
North, 1990) Other economists, stressing that many repeated games have multiple equilibria, have 
proposed that the concept of "institutions" needs to include not only the formal rules of the game (the 
"law") but also the particular equilibrium or self-sus~aining pattern of play that has evolved (the 
"custom"). (Schotter, 1981, was among the first to argue this way) This definition seems to fit both 
statute and common law, and government policies, including the particular ways they have come to be 
enforced. More generally, it seems to fit the durable parts of "public environment" within which 
individual actions proceed, and which constrains and frames such actions. 
It does not directly seem to fit the "organizations" in the environment, like dominant firms like 
IBM, and universities and banking systems. However while, according to the definition above, particular 
organizations would not be considered as institutions, generally accepted forms of governance and 
structure of kinds of organizations might be. Thus to the extent that Harvard or the University at 
California are taken as models of what research universities should be, and other universities model 
themselves after them, one can speak of research universities as institutions. In this same sense one also 
can see corporate forms widely prevalent in an economy as institutions, to the extent that there is a belief 
that these forms are right and appropriate. (Williamson, 1985) This clearly is the intended meaning of 
scholars who have argued that American firms are stuck in their old common ways and beliefs. 
Of course institutions are not constant. They do change, if perhaps slowly. The question of how 
they change would appear to be a fundamental challenge for growth theory. 
In the 1970s a few intrepid economists put forth the hypothesis that "institutions evolve 
optimally". (See e.g. Demsetz, 1967, and Davis and North, 1971). Just how this was supposed to 
happen was never layed out, however. Since that time economists have become much more aware of 
major differences across nations in institutions - differences that seem to make a big difference - and thus 
to be more aware that in some countries the processes that guide the evolution of institutions seem to be 
more effective than in other countries. They also have come to understand that these processes are very 
complex, and poorly understood. (see e.g. North, 1990). 
In his 1952 article Abramovitz flagged broad national institutions, supporting or constraining 
industry, as at once something economists need to understand if they are to understand growth, and a 
topic whose exploration will require them to step over the traditional boundaries of their discipline. In 
my view getting a good intellectual grip on institutions is going to be harder than getting a better model 
of technological change, or firm capabilities, and their dynamics, simply because "institutions" are so 
diffuse. But as Abramovitz said forty years ago, if we are to understand growth we will have to 
somehow understand institutions. 
V. An Agenda 
Understanding economic growth better surely should be of very top priority for economic 
research during the 1990s. There is so much that we don't understand. The slowdown in growth in the 
United States after the 1960s remains a puzzle. Economists still have little clue regarding whether that 
slow growth reflects a general falling off of technological progress which will affect productivity growth 
in all countries as they approach American levels, or whether a good share of the cause is specific to the 
United States who will soon be surpassed by other economies. We have a somewhat better understanding 
of why growth rates in Europe and Japan slowed after the late 1960s. However, our understanding of 
why Japan moved from the bottom of the pack of advanced industrial nations in the early 1960s to close 
to the top of the pack by 1990 is not very strong. 
Limitations on space have prevented me from more than simply mentioning the extremely uneven 
performance among nations that were very poor as of 1960. Some, like Korea and Taiwan, have grown 
rapidly and seem to be becoming sophisticated industrial powers. The less developed nations who have 
not had that successful experience naturally look to Korea and Taiwan, but it is not very clear exactly 
what went on in those economies that others can readily imitate. 
The surge of writings that is coming to be called "the new growth theory" reflects this growing 
awareness among economists that much about economic growth remains a puzzle. Some of the 
new models have effectively incorporated a number of the understandings about growth, and particularly 
about technical advance, that have been gained over the years by those doing empirical research. This 
is at once a gain for the formal modeling part of the research enterprise, and a gain for the appreciative 
theorizing part, enriching the former, and bringing new rigor to sharpen the insights of the latter. 
However, while the new growth theories have taken on board important elements of recent 
appreciative theorizing about growth, there are a number of elements that have been missed. I want to 
conclude this essay by highlighting aspects of technical advance, of firms, and of institutions, that in my 
view are high priority targets for incorporation in formal growth theory. I also want to discuss the 
treatment of uncertainty. 
Technical Advance: Some of the new growth models focus on endogenous technical advance won 
through the investments of business firms (e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 1990, Grossman and Helpman, 1989, 
and Romer 1990) and others on the productivity enhancing effects of the growth of human capital (Lucas, 
1989), with the latter argument associated (at least partly) with the proposition that human capital 
contributes to the advance of technology. However, to date the new models have not taken in the 
understanding that both available highly trained human capital, and investments by firms to use such 
capital in creating new technology, are required for technical advance. Modeling R and D as requiring 
certain kinds of human capital would get some of the key complementarities and interactions expressed 
in appreciative theorizing into the formal growth models. 
Also, the new growth theories treat the dynamics of technical advance rather mechanically. The 
cumulative learning process whereby a new technology develops towards its potential and finds it range 
of fruitful uses is almost totally repressed (although Lucas, 1993, captures some elements of it). This 
limits the ability of the formal theorizing to engage with appreciative theorizing about, for example, long 
waves, or, the long-time lags that often are involved before a major new technology affects productivity 
(David, 1991). And, to the extent that cumulative learning is specific to particular technologies, building 
it in would enable the theory to address a range of phenomena associated with competing technologies, 
and firms and countries that are specialized in one or another. (See e.g. Arthur, 1988, 1989, and David, 
1985, 1992). 
Firms: The new formal models continue in the spirit of the older ones in treating the actions 
taken by firms as determined by the environment they are in, and ignoring anything like Schumpeter's 
"entrepreneurship" or Abramovitz' "enterprise". Of course formal theories aimed at explaining growth 
at a macroeconomic level call for a quite parsimonious treatment of firms. However, if the objective is 
to capture, albeit in stylized form, some of the key insights about, for example the factors behind 
differences in the growth performance of the U.S. and Japan, that appreciative theorists have highlighted, 
it seems essential not to have a model in which what firms do is tightly and uniquely determined by the 
broad economic environment they are in. Rather, one needs a model in which firms have room to 
develop rather unique characteristics. In turn, the characteristics of firms, as they have developed in a 
particular era and country, can be treated as a factor influencing economic growth. 
In modern economies firms are not only the dominant undertakers of R and D and physical 
investment. To a considerable extent they are the sources of the funding for these activities, and they 
determine how these investments are allocated. As the dialogue about Japanese and American firms has 
brought to our attention, firms provide much of the effective demand for people with various kinds and 
levels of training and skills, and in some economies provide a good fraction of the training. Firm 
behaviors that are unprofitable over the long run tend to get extinguished. But both inter- and intra- 
country comparative analysis reveals that, at any time, there is apparently considerable room for 
variation. And it is nearly a sure thing that that variation matters. If so, formal growth theory needs to 
take it aboard. 
Institutions: While business firms clearly are the central actors in most areas of technical 
advance, it seems important to bring other institutional actors into the formal theory. My first candidate 
is universities. Whereas firms can be viewed as funding themselves, and doing research that leads both 
to proprietary technology and "public externalities", universities might be modelled as entities that are 
funded by governments (out of tax revenues) and which create knowledge into which all firms can tap. 
I note that one advantage of this formulation is that introduction of "basic research" in this way provides 
another way of seeing why the system as a whole does not seem to be experiencing diminishing returns. 
Another advantage is that it builds into the formal theory a way of encompassing the public aspects of 
technological knowledge without having to rely totally on unintended "spillovers". 
For the reasons I indicated above, building in "institutions" to our formal growth theories will 
be a difficult challenge, among other reasons because the things that are called institutions are so diverse. 
Some models of course already have built in things like tax laws. The introduction of universities would 
build in another kind of institutional actor. This would seem a useful step forward. 
Uncertainty: All of the above discussion calls attention to a more general mismatch between the 
new formal growth theories, and the appreciative theories discussed above. It lies in the treatment of 
uncertainty and the behavioral consequences of uncertainty. Several of the new formal models treat the 
advent of new technology probabilistically. However, in their specification of the knowledge and 
behavior of the actors, the authors assume that the actors know that probability distribution and make 
their decisions optimally in the light of that knowledge. In Frank Knight's terms, this reduces the 
uncertainty to (correctly understood) risk. However, a hallmark of technological advance, as the scholars 
studying it empirically describe the process, is that the involved actors do not have sufficient information 
to assign meaningful probabilities to the possible outcomes of their doing one thing or another, or even 
to list the set of possible outcomes in any detail. Where they do assign probabilities, or act as if they did, 
with the vision of hindsight it often appears that they had them quite wrong. 
Of course the key question is what kind of important limitations or misspecifications in modeling 
growth are caused by treating uncertainty as if it were correctly understood risk. I would argue that one 
consequence is that such a treatment makes it difficult (although not impossible) to model technical 
advance as involving the diverse bets (perhaps invoked by different broad firm strategies) made by a 
number of competing firms, with ex-post selection determining the technology (and perhaps the firms) 
that ultimately comes to dominate in a field. Under such a formulation, variables like the number and 
diversity of competitors, and the extent to which some (at least) propose radical departures from the status 
quo (which may succeed or fail), become factors influencing technical advance, as well as simply total 
R and D investments. (This perspective on technical advance is, of course, that taken by "evolutionary" 
theory. See e.g. Nelson and Winter 1982 and, for a survey, Nelson, forthcoming). In turn, such a 
perspective could lead to an attempt to model "institutions" that tended to support, or hinder, diversity 
and creativity. 
Over forty years ago Abrarnovitz flagged technical advance, the role of the enterprise, and the 
broader cultural and institutional factors surrounding and supporting enterprise as the factors behind the 
"immediate" sources of growth, and said that understanding all three was a challenge. It still is. 
Appreciative theorizing for some time has been struggling with the questions about technology and 
technical advance, and recently has begun to home in on firms. Appreciative theorizing about institutions 
is experiencing a welcome renaissance. But if my arguments about the relationships between appreciative 
theorizing and formal theorizing are on the mark, to be fully effective appreciative theorizing needs help 
from formal theorizing. The "agenda for formal growth theory" that I have sketched above may be 
regarded as a call for such help. 
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